Kiirlaenude refinantseerimine

In particular, we conduct a randomized field experiment to test whether additional content on Wikipedia pages about cities affects tourists\' choices of overnight visits. The impact is largely driven by improvements to shorter and relatively incomplete pages on Wikipedia. Even when selling cash, the seller may obtain revenue that is much higher or lower than its nominal value, and losers in an auction sometimes pay much more than the winner. The results show that a high variance of outcomes is a natural property of the penny auction format and high revenues are inconsistent with rational risk-neutral participants. It fails to hold whenever the demand function is non-linear, marginal cost is not constant, goods are differentiated, firms are non-identical, or there are any externalities. All the results are given for general partial commitment and therefore include full commitment and no commitment as special cases. Finally, I model partial commitment power as a penalty that the seller has to pay when forfeiting a promise.

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. More information Publications The standard model of sequential capacity choices is the Stackelberg quantity leadership model with linear demand. Its current trading status is "not reported". Kiirlaenude refinantseerimine. Esimesed kiirlaenud Eesti turul olid peamiselt SMS ehk sõnumilaenud, kus selleks, et laenu saada, tuli saata sõnum  lühinumbrile. Even if buyers are risk-loving only asymptotically, the seller can construct a non-random winner-pays auction that ensures unbounded profits. Outcomes of real-life penny auctions are often surprising. The profits are unbounded even if the seller cannot use any mechanism that resembles a lottery. Kiirlaenude refinantseerimine. To limit risk-taking, gambling is heavily regulated in most countries. In addition to characterizing the fully optimal mechanism, I study the optimal mechanisms in two restricted classes. However, this Stackelberg independence property relies on all standard assumptions being satisfied. In order to capture the information rents of passengers with high expected values, ticket repurchases at the time of departure are at a subsidized price, sometimes leading to unused capacity. I study a repeated mechanism design problem where a revenue-maximizing monopolist sells a fixed number of service slots to randomly arriving buyers with private values and increasing exit rates. Seal leiate kohe palju infot, mida teil vaja on ja ka kalkulaatori, mis näitab teile kohe, millistel tingimustel te laenu võtate. Auctions at the time of departure efficiently allocate space and a profit maximizing airline can capitalize on these gains by overbooking flights and repurchasing excess tickets from those passengers whose realized value is low. First, the pure calendar mechanism, where the seller allocates future service dates instead of general promises. Both the waiting list and the fully optimal mechanism are implemented by non-standard auctions with a scoring rule where the distance between buyers' bids affects the allocation. Our findings highlight the value of content in digital public goods for informing individual choices. Our treatment of adding information to Wikipedia increases overnight stays in treated cities compared to non-treated cities.

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. Second, I analyze the waiting list mechanism, where promises of delayed service can depend on future arrivals, but the seller cannot discriminate among buyers who are offered the same position in the waiting list. Buyers are asymptotically risk-loving, for example, when their preferences satisfy Savage's axioms or they have cumulative prospect theory preferences. A novel property of these auctions is that for buyers it is better to win by a close margin and it is worse to lose by a close margin. I show that protecting risk-loving buyers is essentially impossible. I show that under the standard assumptions, leaders' actions are informative about market conditions and independent of leaders' beliefs about the arrivals of followers. Nevertheless profit maximization entails distortions away from the efficient allocation. Laen odavalt.. This paper characterizes all symmetric Markov-perfect equilibria of penny auctions and studies penny auctions' properties. In order to encourage early booking, passengers who purchase late are disadvantaged. I show that small deviations from the linear demand assumption may make the leaders' choices completely uninformative. Tänapäeval on sageli lihtsam võtta kiirlaen internetist, pakkuja veebilehel. Coverage: Quartz.We document a causal impact of online user-generated information on real-world economic outcomes. Kiirlaenude refinantseerimine. Under standard regularity conditions we show that the optimal mechanism can be implemented by a modified double auction. The unique optimal pure calendar mechanism is characterized in terms of the opportunity costs of allocating additional service slots. Asymptotically risk-loving preferences are both sufficient and necessary for unbounded profits.